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European Respiratory Society Research Seminar on Harm Reduction Ferney-Voltaire, France October 3-4, 2005

What is at stake? What are the possible gains and risks? Dr  Murray Laugesen

The aims of Laugesen’s presentation were to elucidate the benefits and risks from adopting harm reduction policies for tobacco control. Laugesen believed that a plan to end combustible tobacco products was needed alongside traditional forms of tobacco control, such as advertising bans, taxation increases, smoke-free policies etc. He believed that, as many other speakers had outlined, there was a clear continuum of risk across nicotine and tobacco products. Cigarette smoking had killed millions in Europe, more than in the two world wars combined, and cigarettes were therefore such a dangerous product they should be phased out. He believed that the tobacco control movement had to state very clearly this end goal, whilst acknowledging that the means to this end could vary.

Although huge gains in tobacco control were being made, Laugesen contended that progress was too slow without developing an additional harm reduction strategy. The average reduction in adult smoking across 22 OECD countries over the last ten years when projected forward (with trends remaining constant) would mean that it would take around 70 years to reduce smoking prevalence to zero. Even slower reductions in prevalence are currently being observed among those groups where prevalence is highest, for example, more deprived groups or indigenous populations in Australia and New Zealand.

The risk of doing nothing was that the status quo remained and cigarettes will continue to dominate in all countries, except Sweden. Laugesen noted that in Sweden, where oral tobacco had been a culturally and legally approved alternative to smoking at least for men, the lung cancer epidemic had never reached great heights and remained lower than for any other developed country. The other major problem with the status quo was that health groups are out of line with the science. Health groups largely approve the continued sales of cigarettes and bans on smokeless tobacco sales, whereas the mortality risk of smokeless is far less than that of cigarettes.

Laugesen proposed a plan to end the sale of combustible tobacco as follows:

Stage 1 – Promote smokeless alternatives. Reduce nicotine in cigarettes.

Stage 2 – Ban combustibles. Retain smokeless products.

Stage 3 – Watch tobacco mortality wane to 5% over next 15 years.

Laugesen clarified that the law would not ban smoking, just the sale of cigarettes, in other words a reverse of the laws currently banning smokeless tobacco in the EU, Australia and New Zealand

 

Laugesen posed a number of research questions concerning smokeless forms of nicotine that he believed urgently needed answering:

·          What are smokers views about snus? Is snus acceptable in non-user countries?

·          Should snus carry a ‘causes heart disease’ warning?

·          Can NRT/nicotine be changed to give a more rapid hit? Does this make it more addictive?

·          Is snus addictive only because of its nicotine, or because of other substances in tobacco?

·          Can nicotine products without tobacco be just as satisfying as snus?

·          Does snus have market advantage because it is sold as a lifestyle drug, has an attached ritual, and is not a treatment?

·          Which is better - upper lip absorption of nicotine versus lower mouth?

Laugesen then turned to examine possible gains from ending combustibles. Laugesen believed that a clear policy to end the sale of combustibles could unite the tobacco control community. He believed that such a goal was feasible, if alternative products providing smokers with pure nicotine or oral tobacco nicotine could be provided. The smoker would have to give up smoking, but not addiction to nicotine.

He believed that by creating alternatives to smoking tobacco there was the potential to accelerate current rates of prevalence reduction. This would depend on the market share of clean nicotine products which would be affected by their legal status and the relative prices of cigarettes versus non-combustible nicotine products.

He suggested that how the different smokeless forms of nicotine (current NRT products, faster acting NRT products and smokeless tobacco products) ranked as substitutes for cigarette smoking and how addictive they were, were key questions for policy development. If a faster acting nicotine product was almost as good as snus then a country with a snus ban in place would have little incentive to lift the ban.

BAT had tried to develop a “safer cigarette” but had found this too difficult, Laugesen believed. BAT had opted instead to enter the smokeless market in South Africa and Sweden. BAT aimed to develop rituals around snus use to replace the former smoking rituals, package the smokeless products attractively, price them just below cigarettes and use well-known cigarette brand names for the snus products. BAT also encouraged the government to tax the snus product thus increasing the price nearer to that of cigarettes, when in fact the health risks were very different.

 

As a low-toxicity smokeless manufacturer, BAT wanted regulations to keep out high-toxicity products. On the other hand, BAT needed breathing space from public health groups’ criticisms for smokeless products to become established (as an alternative to cigarettes).

Laugesen noted that the price of NRT was about the same as cigarettes in New Zealand, whereas in the US it was some three times more expensive than cigarettes. In a comparison of consumption reductions in men in New Zealand and Sweden, Laugesen noted that between 1990 and 2000 Sweden had reduced cigarette consumption to a greater extent than New Zealand, without raising the costliness of cigarettes as in New Zealand. He thought the greater reduction in male cigarette consumption in Sweden was due to the rising male consumption of snus in Sweden. Laugesen commented that a risk-based tobacco excise could be implemented such that excise taxes were levied proportional to the risk of each tobacco product. Finally, he commented that the use of smokeless forms of nicotine would have the following effects on mortality rates:  help to end indoor second-hand smoke exposure which would impact on mortality within around three years; aid smokers to quit smoking and reduce relapse which would impact on mortality rates within a period of around 15 years; and be an alternative to smoking for teenagers which would have an impact on mortality over a longer period from about 20 to 50 years.

Laugesen then went on to outline the risks from adopting such an approach. In particular, he was concerned that it could blur the quit message.

The current simple quit message is clear and unequivocal, whereas refining this to say ‘quit smoking but you don’t have to quit nicotine or tobacco’ means educating smokers that nicotine is not necessarily bad after all. To counter this, more emphasis has to be placed on the dangers of smoking.

Lack of policies and research to support reducing combustible sales to zero, could mean that this end-goal is seen as unobtainable.

In addition, if there was no firm goal to end smoking, reduced toxicity cigarettes could be seen as cementing the continuance of smoking, instead of a precautionary protective measure for smokers until such time as cigarettes are no longer sold.

Laugesen believed that the health community, in its zeal to oppose the tobacco industry, often: failed to differentiate between the cigarette manufacturers and the smokeless companies and the risks of their respective products;

 

encouraged members not to communicate with any part of the industry; and failed to major in cigarette research and science, leaving the field of regulation to the expertise of the cigarette makers.

In particular he felt it important that funding be found for the research to replace cigarettes as a nicotine source. He believed that the simplest way was a tax levy per cigarette or funding could be donated by industry with ‘no strings attached’ on how it was used.

Laugesen summarised by saying that comprehensive tobacco control programmes, even with the help of subsidised NRT are slow in reducing smoking prevalence. Nicotine products and snus are far safer than any modified cigarette. The ERS need to inform people in Europe that this is indeed the case. Cigarettes are the most dangerous of all tobacco products and public health groups need to adopt the overarching goal of phasing out cigarettes. Research is needed to clarify whether fast-acting nicotine will match the effects of snus, be safer than snus and superior to current NRT products. He believed that multi-centre research on alternatives to smoking was required.

Discussion Some believed that the proposal to ban cigarettes would not work. Laugesen answered that the end goal of banning cigarettes need not be immediate, and also need not happen in our lifetime, but that a start needed to be made. Some countries already contemplate the feasibility of a zero prevalence of smoking, such as Australia. Having such a goal will help clarify thinking in this area, and make tackling the issue of smokeless tobacco products more urgent.

Consensus statement. Following the discussion, Godfrey amended the meeting consensus statement to reflect the comments made, as follows:

·         Harm reduction is desirable as part of a comprehensive tobacco control programme

·         Nicotine is not the problem

·         Combustible products are the problem

·         The status quo should not continue

·         Snus is a lot less harmful than cigarettes

·         Snus also has potential as a smoking cessation aid

·         Lifting the EU ban on snus within a proper regulatory framework needs to be considered

·         The ‘playing field’ for clean nicotine should be levelled by deregulation, taxation and pricing measures

·     Toxic ingredients should be removed from conventional cigarettes.

 

Rapporteur Dr Ann McNeill, UK

Note: EndSmoking NZ agrees with this 2005 ERS seminar consensus statement.

 Dr Murray Laugesen QSO chair; Prof Ross McCormick, Sir John Scott KBE, Trish Fraser MPH, Dr Marewa Glover, Trustees

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